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THE “PRINCIPAL PURPOSE” DRIVEN 
LIFE: HOW HOSPITALS SHOULD 
APPLY ERISA’S CHURCH PLAN 
EXEMPTION AFTER ADVOCATE V. 
STAPLETON 
VIRGINIA L. BROWN, B.B.A., J.D. 
“KNOWING YOUR PURPOSE GIVES MEANING TO YOUR LIFE.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States’ health care industry is filled with numerous protections 
for individuals and entities who have objections based on religious beliefs and 
moral convictions. 2 For example, there is a long history of conscience 
protections for individuals that object to performing or assisting in the 
performance of abortion or sterilization procedures3 or assisted suicide 
(including euthanasia or mercy killing).4 Over time, as more medical entities 
declare affiliation with religious entities, Congress has expanded conscience 
protections to cover more than just the daily activities of medical professionals. 
Generally, churches have to comply with the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA or the Act) just like any other employer. Yet, Congress 
provided an exception from ERISA for the administration of “church plans.”5 
This exemption has existed for many years without issue until recently, when 
this exemption became the subject of increased litigation. ERISA defines 
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 1. Rick Warren, THE PURPOSE DRIVEN LIFE: WHAT ON EARTH AM I HERE FOR? (2002). 
 2. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under 
the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792, 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 et eq. (collectively known as the “Church Amendments”); 42 U.S.C. § 238n; 
Weldon Amendment, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 11-117, 123 Stat 3034.  
 4. 42 U.S.C. § 18113. 
 5. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(1) (2018).  
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“church plan”6 to apply more broadly than merely to plans covering people who 
work in houses of worship; schools, nursing homes, and hospitals may also 
comply if they are controlled or owned by religious entities.7 Most recently, 
questions have risen regarding whether the employee pension plans used by 
religiously-affiliated hospitals have been correctly classified as “church plans” 
exempt from ERISA.8 The answers to these questions carry with it large 
consequences because qualified church plans are excused from certain coverage, 
vesting, benefit accrual, and funding requirements of ERISA and the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC) that otherwise apply to tax-qualified plans.9 
In the 2017 landmark case Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, one 
question that had long been debated between circuit courts regarding the extent 
of this exemption was resolved; the Court determined that a plan established and 
maintained by a church includes a plan maintained by a principal purpose 
organization.10 This ruling means that any religiously-controlled entity that 
manages an employee benefit plan no longer must be created by a religious entity 
in order to qualify for this exemption. Regardless of how (and by whom) the 
entity was first established, an organization may still take advantage of this 
exemption from ERISA as long as the entity is maintained by a principal purpose 
organization.  
This Supreme Court ruling is far from a full resolution of the issue. 
Advocate left a few issues unresolved, such as the definition of “principle 
purpose organization.” This leaves religiously-affiliated hospitals in a sticky 
place: unsure if they qualify for—and therefore can rely on—the ERISA church 
exemption. Since there are many potentially devastating effects on non-
qualifying hospitals that mistakenly relied on this exemption, it is important for 
the qualifying factors to be clear. No longer should religiously-affiliated 
hospitals seek and rely on non-binding (and sometimes inaccurate) private letter 
rulings (PLRs) issued by the IRS in order to determine their exemption status.  
In Part I, this Comment will discuss ERISA’s church plan exemption pre- 
and post-Advocate. Additionally, it will cover a brief overview of the history of 
employee benefit plans in the healthcare system and describe the roles of 
different governmental entities. In Part II, this Comment will discuss the 
landmark case Advocate v. Stapleton and its impact on the employee benefit 
industry, and the current status of ERISA’s principal purpose requirement. Last, 
 
 6. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3(33)(A), 88 Stat. 829, 
838 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2018)). This definition of church plan is a mirror image of 
the definition of church plan set out in § 414(e) as amended by ERISA. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(2).  
 7. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(2); Emily Morrison, Revisiting ERISA’s Church Plan Exemption After 
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281–82 (2017). 
 8. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017). 
 9. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(2); See also Morrison, supra note 7, at 1281–82 (examining the legislative 
history of the church plan exemption and case law development that impacts the exemption). 
 10. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017). 
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Part III will suggest a new set of factors that each religiously-controlled hospital 
and its employee benefit subcommittees can rely on in determining if it meets 
the “principal purpose” requirement. 
PART I: ERISA’S CHURCH PLAN EXEMPTION 
A. Timeline of Significant Healthcare and ERISA Events 
Congress has consistently expanded healthcare law over time—especially 
as it relates to employee benefits—to protect the average American.11 Courts 
have been more willing to protect against various forms of discrimination when 
it relates to the blanket application of healthcare, as seen in the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 and the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996.12 There have also been many 
significant milestones throughout the history of ERISA in the healthcare 
industry. Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 for the purpose of setting minimum 
standards for most voluntarily-established private retirement plans and health 
plans.13 Shortly after the adoption of this Act, the IRS held that the church plan 
exemption did not extend to hospitals established by an order of Catholic nuns 
because the hospitals did not include “religious functions.”14 Congress responded 
with an amendment in 1980 to broaden the exemption to its present state. 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 permitted limitations on 
the amount of benefits provided and prohibited employers from excluding 
employees from retirement plans when they are hired within five years of normal 
retirement age. In 1986, the Tax Reform Act further tightened the 
nondiscrimination requirements for retirement plans. The Family Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA) of 1993 brought more big changes to the field of employment 
regulations; it generally provided covered employees the right to take an unpaid 
leave of absence from work for medical or family obligations without 
jeopardizing their employment. While an employee is on FMLA leave, the 
employer must maintain the employee’s group health plan coverage. Another big 
change to the field of medicine came in 1996 when Congress enacted the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).15 This act amended 
 
 11. PRACTICAL LAW EMP. BENEFITS & EXEC. COMP., SIGNIFICANT EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE ENACTMENT OF ERISA TIMELINE, PRACTICAL LAW CHECKLIST 1-577-3228, 
Westlaw.  
 12. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1151 100 Stat. 2085, 2494–09; Mental Health 
Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, §§ 701–703, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944–50. 
 13. History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., available at 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa (last visited July 12, 
2019). 
 14. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,266, 1977 WL 46200, *5-6 (Sept. 22, 1977). 
 15. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(“[T]o improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and individual 
markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the 
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ERISA to provide increased health plan portability of coverage by limiting 
preexisting condition exclusions and to prohibit discrimination against 
participants and beneficiaries based on their health status. Also, this act required 
any entities covered by HIPAA to implement safeguards to protect the security 
of health insurance information in electronic form.  
More significant changes came in 2010 with the enactment of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).16 This act added the employer 
mandate, which penalizes employers for failing to offer its employees health 
coverage (or to offer inadequate coverage). In 2012, the Supreme Court held that 
the PPACA’s individual mandate was a constitutional exercise of Congress’ 
power to tax.17 Yet, Congress effectively eliminated this individual mandate as 
part of sweeping tax reform legislation by reducing the penalty to $0, effective 
in 2019.18  In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Court found that the PPACA’s 
contraception coverage mandate—part of the law’s preventative services rules—
violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as applied to for-profit 
closely-held corporations with religious objective to the contraceptives 
mandate.19 
B. Purpose and Enactment of ERISA 
ERISA was enacted, in part, to provide stronger protection and security for 
the pensions of American workers should their current or former employers 
unexpectedly go out of business and drain any funds previously promised for 
pensions.20 ERISA imposes extensive requirements on private retirement and 
welfare plans, such as reporting, disclosure, vesting, benefit accrual, and funding 
requirements.21 
Congress provided some exceptions within ERISA—the most relevant here 
is the church plan exception22—which exempts churches from many of ERISA’s 
standards. In providing this exemption, Congress intended to avoid government 
entanglement with church business.23 Some experts have speculated that this 
 
use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term care services and coverage, to simplify 
the administration of health insurance, and for other purposes.”).  
 16. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. (2018)). 
 17. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012). 
 18. See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, 2054-2238 (2017).  
 19. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014). 
 20. History of EBSA and ERISA, U.S. DEP’T. OF LAB., https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-
ebsa/about-us/history-of-ebsa-and-erisa (last visited July 12, 2019). 
 21. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1284 (citing Colleen E. Medill, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 31–32 (4th ed. 2015)). 
 22. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 4(b)(2), 88 Stat. 829, 
839–40 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (2018)).  
 23. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1287 
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exemption was provided based on Congress’s “belief that churches have a 
particularly strong moral commitment to their employees and are likely to keep 
the pension promises they make to their employees.”24 By providing this 
exemption, Congress allowed churches to create and manage their own plans for 
their employees’ retirement. In the long run, this exemption may save churches 
lots of money and allow them to better allocate their tithed income to their 
charitable purpose. Congress has also extended this exemption to other 
religiously-affiliated organizations, such as hospitals and schools, under the 
belief that they shared a similar moral commitment to their employees.  
On one hand, exempting plans from ERISA are risky because it puts 
employees in a potentially catastrophic position if their career-long contributions 
to a pension becomes insolvent by their retirement date.25 On the other hand, 
exemption is beneficial because compliance with ERISA is expensive, which 
adds yet another cost to the already increasing price of healthcare.26 
Issues arise when an organization is not sure whether it qualifies for the 
church exemption. If church leaders assume they are exempt and operate their 
retirement plans outside the umbrella of ERISA, there is a risk that they later 
discover they are not exempt and are immediately responsible for back payment 
of taxes and penalties. Because there is no clear standard, each entity must seek 
individual guidance from the IRS or Department of Labor (DOL) regarding 
whether they are exempt.  
Yet, even if church-affiliated organizations obtain qualification 
confirmation for the church plan exemption, the fight over pension plan 
administration will simply shift to the state courts.27 This is not ideal because 
many states do not have specific statutes analogous to ERISA; rather, the 
governing law will be based on the states’ common law of trusts, fiduciary duties, 
and contracts.28 Church-affiliated organizations that operate across state borders 
will potentially have to determine and comply with multiple sets of legal 
obligations that vary by state.29 Therefore, an exemption from ERISA does not 
 
 24. Norman Stein, An Article of Faith: The Gratuity Theory of Pensions and Faux Church Plans, 
A.B.A EMP. BENEFITS COMM. NEWSL. (Summer 2014), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20180109033327/http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/lab
or_law/ebc_newsletter/14_sum_ebc_news/faith.html.  
 25. Ronald Mann, Opinion analysis: Justices unanimously uphold ERISA exemption for church-
affiliated pension plans, SCOTUS BLOG (June 5, 2017, 3:47 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinion-analysis-justices-unanimously-uphold-erisa-exemption-
church-affiliated-pension-plans/. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Joanne C. Youn & Robert G. Cluett, Church-Affiliated Organizations Face New Challenges After 
Advocate, 29 TAX’N EXEMPTS 26, 28 (2017) (discussing church-affiliated organizations’ best options for 
determining their exemption status under ERISA).  
 28. Id. at 29.   
 29. Id.  
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guarantee that pension plans will impose fewer obligations on their 
participants.30 
C. The Role of the IRS 
The IRS bears much of the responsibility for overseeing church pension 
plans and its interpretation and application of the church plan definition has 
remained relatively consistent over time.31 The IRS disseminates its 
interpretation of this statute primarily through the issuance of private letter 
rulings (PLRs), which are determinations issued to specific taxpayers upon 
request.32 Every organization can request a PLR that will indicate whether it is 
eligible for the exemption, however, these PLRs only bind the requesting party. 
Over the years, religiously-affiliated entities have relied on obtaining these 
individual PLRs in order to operate their plans as ERISA-exempt church plans.33 
This is not ideal, though, because it takes lots of money and time to acquire these 
rulings, which may only be a realistic option for larger and more powerful 
entities.34 While a church may take advantage of the ERISA exemption without 
a PLR from the IRS, most hospitals and other religiously-affiliated entities still 
regularly request PLRs to offer confirmation of their plans’ status for tax 
purposes.35 A PLR is basically useless to other non-requesting organizations 
because it is applicable only to the specific taxpayer to whom it is issued and 
may not be used or cited as precedent.36 Additionally, a PLR has no binding 
effect on any court that may later consider the exempt status of an organization.37 
Therefore, reliance on PLRs is far from an ideal situation. 
D. The Role of the Department of Labor 
The Department of Labor (DOL) is another federal agency that administers 
and enforces ERISA. DOL has not issued either a regulation or interpretation 
concerning what constitutes a church plan. To date, the DOL has only issued an 
information release that indicates they are awaiting further development of the 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Jeffrey A. Herman, Resolving ERISA’s “Church Plan” Problem, 31 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 231, 
251 (2016). 
 32. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1284. 
 33. Id.  
 34. User fees for PLRs range from $250 to $50,000. Rev. Proc. 2018-1, Section 15. When only one 
branch of the IRS is involved, a ruling can take two to three months. When the issue is more complex and 
more branches are involved, a ruling can take over three months.  
 35. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1284. 
 36. Id. at 1291. 
 37. Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.  (July 6, 2016) 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer. 
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IRS regulations prior to issuing any of their own regulations.38 They have, 
however, issued some Advisory Opinions under ERISA Procedure 76-1 that 
provide interpretative guidance for § 3(33) of ERISA as it relates to certain 
employee benefit arrangements.39 
E. Defining “Church Plan” 
To be exempt from taxation under I.R.C. § 501, an employer need not be a 
church to sponsor a church plan as long as the plan of the employer is established 
and maintained by an organization that is controlled by or associated with a 
church or convention or association of churches.40 Typically, a religious hospital 
will establish a subcommittee whose sole duty is to manage the benefit plans. An 
organization is “controlled” by a church if the majority of its officers or directors 
are appointed by the church’s governing board or by officials of the church.41 An 
organization is “associated with” a church or by a convention or association of 
churches if it shares common religious bonds and convictions with the church.42  
In 1974, Congress originally defined a church plan as one “established and 
maintained for its employees by a church or by a convention or association of 
churches.”43 After the 1980 ERISA amendment, Subsection A of the statute now 
reads:  
The term ‘church plan’ means a plan established and maintained (to 
the extent required in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B)) for its 
employees (or their beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or 
association of churches which is exempt from tax under section 501 
of title 26.44 
The current Subsection C (an expansion of the church plan definition under 
Subsection A) has remained the same since 1980; it reads: 
A plan established and maintained for its employees (or their 
beneficiaries) by a church or by a convention or association of 
churches includes a plan maintained by an organization, whether a 
civil law corporation or otherwise, the principal purpose or function 
of which is the administration or funding of a plan or program for the 
 
 38. Gail Jones, Government and Single-Employer Collectively Bargained Plans, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV. TAX EXEMPT & GOV’T ENTITIES  4-10, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/epchd403.pdf 
(last visited July. 31, 2019).  
 39. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Advisory Opinion 2004-11A (Dec. 30, 2004). 
 40. Daniel J. Schwartz, Employee Benefits for Tax-Exempt Organizations (Portfolio 487), 
BLOOMBERG TAX, https://www.bna.com/employee-benefits-taxexempt-p73014475830/ (last visited Apr. 
7, 2019). 
 41. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(3)(A) (2018). 
 42. Id. § 414(e)(3)(D). 
 43. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3(33)(A), 88 Stat. 829, 
838 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2018)).   
 44. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(A) (2018); 26 U.S.C. § 414 (e)(1) (2018) (providing a parallel citation in 
the Tax Code).  
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provision of retirement benefits or welfare benefits, or both, for 
the employees of a church or a convention or association of churches, 
if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church or a 
convention or association of churches.45 
In summary, a “church plan” established and maintained by a church 
includes a plan maintained by a principal purpose organization.46 Some big 
issues that remain are the meaning of the terms “established and maintained” and 
“includes,” and the interaction of Subsection C and Subsection A of the statute. 
Yet, this Comment will not address those issues. It is unclear when an 
organization is considered to be a principal purpose organization, such as under 
what circumstances the administration of an employee benefit plan is the 
organization’s principal purpose.47  
If an organization qualifies for an ERISA exemption, it still has the option 
to use or ignore that exemption; when deciding what direction to go, entities must 
weigh the benefits and burdens of aligning their retirement plan to ERISA’s 
standards. There are two types of church plans: non-electing church plans and 
electing church plans.48 If a church qualifies for the ERISA exemption and 
chooses to take advantage of it, the default rule applies and it is designated a non-
electing church plan. In such a case, non-electing church plans do not have to 
meet the funding, vesting, reporting, and disclosure requirements under ERISA. 
However, these plans will remain subject to the Tax Code’s qualified plan 
provisions that preexisted ERISA.49 Sometimes, though, a church may qualify 
for the ERISA exemption but choose not to use it. These so-called electing 
church plans qualify for church plan status, but nonetheless opt into ERISA under 
Section 410(d) of the Tax Code.50 Once made, an election is irrevocable.  
F. Circuit Splits Leading Up to the Supreme Court’s 2017 Decision 
Today, it is still unclear how the two subsections of ERISA § 33 relate to 
one another because federal courts across the United States have failed to apply 
Subsections C and A in a uniform manner.51 The Third, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits have affirmed rulings that interpreted the exemptions narrowly, finding 
that the two subsections dictate that the religiously-affiliated hospital systems’ 
pension plans do not qualify as church plans because they were not established 
 
 45. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(i) (emphasis added). 
 46. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1663 (2017).  
 47. See id. at 1657 n.2 (noting that the court’s opinion is not addressing the issue of whether the 
hospital’s internal benefits committees are principal purpose organizations under ERISA).  
 48. Morrison, supra note 7, at 1288. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  
 51. See id. at 1297 (citing Jeffrey A. Herman, Resolving ERISA’s “Church Plans” Problem, 31 
A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 231, 232 (2016)). 
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by a church.52 In contrast, other district courts have embraced a broader 
interpretation, finding that “church plans do not have to be established by 
churches as long as the plans are properly maintained by a church-affiliated 
organization.”53 
The leading case in the Third Circuit is Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare 
System.54 This case involved a suit filed by current and former employees of St. 
Peter’s Healthcare System, which operated St. Peter’s University Hospital and 
other companies (St. Peter’s).55 St. Peter’s established its defined benefit pension 
plan in 1974 and operated it as an ERISA plan for more than thirty years before 
reconsidering its plan’s status and seeking a church plan PLR in 2006.56 The 
district court held that St. Peter’s pension plan was not a church plan because the 
plain language of the statute requires that a “church plan must, from the outset, 
be established by a church and can be maintained by an organization controlled 
by or associated with a church.”57 The district court declined to give deference 
to the PLR that St. Peter’s had received from the IRS and the Third Circuit 
affirmed.58 
The Seventh Circuit’s leading case on the issue is Stapleton v. Advocate 
Health Care Network.59 In this case, former and current employees filed a claim 
against the Advocate hospital system, which operates twelve hospitals across 
Illinois and employs more than 33,000 employees.60 Advocate was formed in 
1995 through the merger of two hospital systems, the Lutheran General Health 
System and the Evangelical Health Systems.61 The district court held that the 
 
 52. See Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517, 523 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that 
because the plan “was both established and maintained by a church-affiliated organization, it is not a 
church plan”), rev’d, Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017); Rollins v. 
Dignity Health, 830 F.3d 900, 905 (9th Cir. 2016) (“In order to qualify for the church-plan exemption 
under subparagraph (C)(i), a plan must have been established by a church and maintained either by a 
church or by a principal-purpose organization”), rev’d, Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 
S. Ct. 1652 (2017); Kaplan v. St. Peter’s Healthcare System, 810 F.3d 175, 181 (3rd Cir. 2015) (“Here, 
Congress carefully limited the church plan exemption to only those plans established by a church”), rev’d, 
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017). 
 53. See Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1191 (D. Colo. 2015) (finding the 
church plan was maintained and administered by a church subcommittee); Overall v. Ascension, 23 F. 
Supp. 3d 816 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (reading the statutory church plan exemption as not requiring 
establishment by a church to maintain church plan designation). 
 54. 810 F.3d 175 (2015), rev’d, Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).  
 55. Id. at 178. 
 56. Id. at 177–78.  
 57. Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., No. 13–2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 1284854, at *6 
(D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014) (emphasis added), aff’d, Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., 810 F.3d 175 
(3rd Cir. 2015), and rev’d, Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017). 
 58. Kaplan, 810 F.3d at 178. 
 59. Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d, Advocate 
Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017). 
 60. Id. at 520. 
 61. Id. at 520–21. 
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pension plan failed to meet the criteria for a church plan exemption solely 
because it was  maintained by a non-church entity.62 The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed, echoing the Third Circuit’s logic. Notably, when the Supreme Court 
reversed, it expressly stated that “nothing we say in this opinion expresses a view 
of . . . [whether] the hospitals’ pension plans are not ‘church plans’ because the 
hospitals do not have the needed association with a church.”63 
Lastly, the most influential case on this instant issue is Rollins v. Dignity 
Health in which the Ninth Circuit examined Dignity Health, a medical facility 
formed through a merger of two religiously-affiliated health systems.64 The 
district court found that the plan was not subject to church plan exemption 
because it was not “established” by a church.65 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.66 
These varying results on similar issues provided a rocky foundation leading 
up to the Supreme Court’s review of Advocate in 2017. The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Advocate rejected all three unanimous views of the circuit courts, 
which paints a cautionary tale for circuit courts that may try to predict how other 
courts might act. 
PART II: THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVES THE CIRCUIT SPLIT WITH ADVOCATE 
A. Advocate Health Care v. Stapleton 
On June 5, 2017, the Supreme Court unanimously sided with the 
religiously-affiliated hospital, reversing the judgments of the Third, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits.67 Justice Kagan explained that the use of the word “includes” in 
the exemption definition is not literal but rather signals to readers of the statute 
that a “different type of plan should receive the same treatments (i.e. an 
exemption) as the type described in the old definition.”68 This interpretation of 
the statute effectively opened up the church plan exemption to more 
organizations than previously thought. Justice Sotomayor concurred to express 
why this outcome still troubled her: the silence of the legislative history on the 
question before the Court in 2017 and the difference between the church plans 
of 1980 when the statute was enacted and those before the Court in 2017.69  
The main takeaway from this case is clear: ERISA provides an exemption 
for an employee benefit plan maintained by a church affiliated organization 
 
 62. Id. at 521–23. 
 63. Cardoza-Estremera v. Berrios, No. CV 16-2318 (ADC), 2017 WL 3098089, at *3 (D.P.R. July 
20, 2017) (quoting Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1664 n.2 (2017)). 
 64. Rollins v. Dignity Health, 830 F.3d 900, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 65. Id. at 903. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017). 
 68. Id. at 1658. 
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regardless of whether a church affiliated organization also established the plan. 
The type of entity—either a church or its affiliate—that established the plan is 
irrelevant.70 Yet, there are two questions that Advocate leaves unaddressed. First, 
how do church-affiliated organizations that satisfy the “maintained” criterion for 
the church plan exemption determine whether they also satisfy the other statutory 
requirements for exemption, and is the exemption itself even permissible under 
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? Second, if the church plan 
exemption does apply, what legal obligations does a non-ERISA plan face in lieu 
of the standards applicable to an ERISA plan?71  
The Court noted in the ruling that it did not address the second requirement 
of the law: that an exempt church plan be maintained by an “organization” that 
has administration of the plan as its principal purpose. Justice Sotomayor 
summarized these concerns in her concurrence:  
Other provisions also impact the scope of the ‘church plan’ 
exemption. Those provisions—including the provisions governing 
which organizations qualify as principal purpose organizations 
permitted to establish and maintain ‘church plans,’ need also be 
construed in line with their text and with a view toward effecting 
ERISA’s broad remedial purposes.72 
Additionally, the Court made it clear that it was not giving deference to 
government analyses of decisions, such as PLRs.73  
B. Principal Purpose Requirements 
A religiously-controlled medical facility cannot itself administer an exempt 
benefit plan for its employees because ERISA requires such a plan to be 
administered by an organization whose principal purpose is to administer that 
retirement plan. A hospital with a charitable purpose must instead operate 
exclusively to further a proper exempt purpose, as defined in I.R.C. § 501, in 
order to maintain its tax-exempt status as a charitable organization. Generally, 
the promotion of health is considered to be a charitable purpose.74 Both Congress 
and the IRS treat § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations as co-partners with the 
federal government because such organizations receive tax-deductible charitable 
contributions and perform their activities with contributed funds.75 Because all 
tax exemptions are a matter of legislative grace, Congress imposes strict 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Joanne C. Youn & Ronald G. Cluett, Church-Affiliated Organizations Face New Challenges 
After Advocate, 29 Tᴀx’ɴ Exᴇᴍᴘᴛꜱ 26, 26 (2017). 
 72. Advocate, 137 S. Ct. at 1663–64 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 1657, 1663 (majority opinion). 
 74. ERIKA LUNDER & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX EXEMPT SECTION 501(C)(3) 
HOSPITALS: COMMUNITY BENEFIT STANDARD AND SCHEDULE H 2–3 (2008). 
 75. Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Information for Charitable Organizations, IRS.GOV, 
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations (last updated Jan. 17, 2019). 
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operating requirements upon qualified organizations.76 The Affordable Care Act 
modified these requirements for tax-exempt hospitals; as of 2010, a § 501(c)(3) 
hospital must satisfy: community health needs assessment rules, financial 
assistance policy rules, charge limitations, and billing and collection rules.77 
Two types of organizations qualify for the church-plan exemption: 
churches and so-called principal purpose organizations.78 After the enactment of 
ERISA, plans maintained by a church-affiliated organization must satisfy 
specific statutory requirements in order to claim the church plan exemption.79 
The IRS requires that church-related employers provide health plans to their 
employees that satisfy the committee requirement under § 414(e)(3)(a); that is, 
it must be maintained by an organization whose principal purpose or function is 
the administration or funding of the plan and which is controlled by, or associated 
with, a church or convention or association of churches.80 Generally, the IRS has 
required plan sponsors—i.e. religiously-controlled hospitals—to satisfy this 
requirement by appointing a committee whose principal function is the 
administration of the plan.81 Yet, the Court in Advocate did not actually 
determine whether the hospitals’ internal benefits committees qualified as a 
“church-associated organization whose chief purpose or function is to fund or 
administer a benefits plan for the employee of either a church or a church-
affiliated nonprofit.”82 Therefore, it is still unclear whether any and all similar 
committees and organizations would satisfy the principal purpose requirement. 
Because the existing legal authority does not fully address or define these 
requirements, further litigation addressing the scope of the ERISA exemption for 
plans maintained by church-affiliated organizations is likely, including 
arguments concerning its constitutionality, as well as those specific to the 
statutory text.83 The Court in Advocate did not address the existence of the letter 
rulings, so those rulings addressing the principal purpose requirements do not 
 
 76. Reagan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983).  
 77. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)-3 (2018); 26 U.S.C. § 501(r)(4); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)–4; 26 U.S.C. 
§ 501(r)(5); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)-5; 26 U.S.C. § 501(r)(6); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(r)-6. 
 78. Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 877 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir. 2017).  
 79. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(i) (2018) (emphasis added) (“A plan established and maintained . . . by 
a church . . . includes a plan maintained by an organization, whether a civil law corporation or otherwise, 
the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or funding of a plan . . . for the employees 
of a church . . . if such organization is controlled by or associated with a church.”). 
 80. DANIEL J. SCHWARTZ, 487 T.M., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS FOR TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, 
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 81. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201739010 (Sept. 29, 2017); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.  201247023 
(Aug. 31, 2012), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201233027 (May 25, 2012), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200813044 (Jan. 
2, 2008), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200708090 (Nov. 28, 2006), I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610023 (Dec. 12, 
2005) 
 82. Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 n.3 (2017). 
 83. Joanne C. Youn & Ronald G. Cluett, Church-Affiliated Organizations Face New Challenges 
After Advocate, TAX’N EXEMPTS 26, 26 (2017). 
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offer authoritative reliance to church-affiliated organization seeking clarity 
regarding the status of their organizational structure.84  
The “principal purpose” standard is vague and difficult to apply, yet carries 
huge implications. Religiously-affiliated hospitals and their affiliated entities 
that maintain their retirement plans under the notion that they are included in 
ERISA’s church plan exemption may face a rude awakening should the Court 
one day interpret this phrase narrowly. These organizations should have some 
test that they can rely upon to determine whether the “principal purpose” 
standard applies to their activities. One main reason why the Court in Advocate 
found the provision at issue to be interpreted widely was to allow organizations 
to better understand their own individual status under the law. Previously, the 
process of obtaining a PLR for each individual organization was arduous, so this 
ruling by the Court was supposed to alleviate that struggle. Yet, that struggle 
remains. Religiously-affiliated health organizations often rely heavily on the 
ERISA church plan exemption in their everyday administration and therefore 
should feel confident that it does indeed qualify for the exemption. The best way 
this uncertainty can be solved is through the creation—or recognition—of a 
universal definition of “principal purpose” as used in ERISA § 33(C)(i). 
PART III: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE ADVOCATE V. STAPLETON AND DEFINING 
“PRINCIPAL PURPOSE” 
A. Introduction 
Since the Supreme Court handed down the opinion in Advocate in the 
summer of 2017, district courts have struggled to apply the new guidelines. The 
limited and vague guidance from the IRS and the Department of Labor only make 
the problem worse. A religiously-affiliated entity will have to take a more 
creative approach in its attempt to clarify the statutory standards. 
B. Defining “Principal Purpose” Through Case Law Guidance  
i. Lown v. Continental Casualty 
The Lown test is a fact-sensitive inquiry that may provide a little more 
guidance for some church-affiliated organizations than the statutory language of 
ERISA, even assuming the other requirements for the church plan exemption can 
be satisfied.85 In Lown v. Continental Casualty Company, an employee of Baptist 
Health System of South Carolina (the System) asserted that litigation of her 
claims under the System’s long-term disability plan was not subject to federal 
 
 84. Id. at 27. 
 85. Id. at 28; Lown v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543. 548 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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question jurisdiction because the System’s ties to the South Carolina Baptist 
Convention exempted the plan from ERISA.86 The Fourth Circuit held that the 
exemption did not apply to the System’s plan because the Baptist Convention 
did not appoint or approve any System board members and did not provide any 
monetary support to the System.87 The court stated that:  
[i]n deciding whether an organization shares common bonds and 
convictions with a church, three factors bear primary consideration: 
(1) whether the religious institution plays any official role in the 
governance of the organization; (2) whether the organization receives 
assistance from the religious institution; and (3) whether a 
denominational requirement exists for any employee or 
patient/customer of the organization. 88  
Applying these factors, the court found the healthcare organization at issue 
did not qualify as a “church plan,” since it had formally disaffiliated from the 
Baptist Convention several years before the litigation, and no denomination 
requirement remained.89 
Applied to the issue at hand, the Lown factors could be helpful in deciding 
whether a religiously-affiliated hospital and its designated subcommittee are 
“principle purpose” organizations. Yet, as Tenth Circuit argued in Medina v. 
Catholic Health Initiatives, these factors are not determinative because they are 
more narrow than the statutory definition found in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(c)(iv).90 
“[T]o be ‘associated with a church,’ a corporation need only share ‘common 
religious bonds and convictions with that church or convention or association of 
churches.’”91 Moreover, the statute imposes no denominational requirements, 
corporate governance requirements, or funding requirements.92 In contrast, an 
organization could meet the statutory definition but satisfy none of the Lown 
factors.93 “Satisfying the Lown factors may suffice to establish that an 
organization is associated with a church,” but an organization need not satisfy 
the Lown factors in order to be associated with a church.94 Therefore, further 
analysis is needed. 
 
 86. Lown, 238 F.3d 543. 
 87. Id. at 548. 
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 90. Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 877 F.3d 1213, 1224 (10th Cir. 2017). 
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ii. Cardoza-Estremera v. Berrios 
Cardoza-Estremera v. Berrios was one of the first district court opinions 
handed down after Advocate that addressed the new Supreme Court guidance.95 
In this case, plaintiffs were parochial-school teachers who participated in the 
employee pension plan of the Catholic Schools of the Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese.96 The complaint alleged that defendant mismanaged plaintiff’s 
pension plan. Defendant moved the court to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs’ 
pension plan is exempt from ERISA because it is a “church plan” within the 
meaning of 29 U.S.C. §1002(33).97 The defendants seemed to think that this 
exemption-based argument contests plaintiffs’ standing to sue.98 The District 
Court of Puerto Rico denied defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the 
exemption status of the plan doesn’t affect the plaintiffs’ standing or the Court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction.99 The court stated that the complaint did state a 
facially plausible claim that ERISA covers the plan.100 
iii. Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives 
In this case, a retirement plan participant brought putative class action 
against her employer, a nonprofit organization created to carry out the Roman 
Catholic Church’s healing ministry, alleging the plan was not an exempt church 
plan under ERISA. The Tenth Circuit simply applied the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Advocate, stating that ERISA extends the church plan exemption to 
so-called principal purpose organizations. The court explicitly defined a 
principal purpose organization as a “church-affiliated organization whose 
principal purpose is administering or funding a benefit plan for the employees of 
a church or a church-affiliated nonprofit organization.”101  
The court went further to find that ERISA § 33(C) imposes a three-step 
inquiry for entities seeking to use the church plan exemption for plans maintained 
by principal purpose organizations.102 These entities can determine if they are 
liable for the church plan exemption by asking the following questions. First, is 
 
 95. Cardoza-Estremera v. Berrios, No. 16-2318 (ADC), 2017 WL 3098098, at *1 (D.P.R. July 20, 
2017). 
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the entity a tax-exempt non-profit organization associated with a church? If so, 
second, is the entity’s retirement plan maintained by a principal purpose 
organization? That is, is the plan maintained by an organization whose principal 
purpose is administrating or funding a retirement plan for entity employees? 
Then, if so, is that principal purpose organization itself associated with a 
church?103  
In Medina, the Court ultimately found in favor of the nonprofit 
organization. Roman Catholic canon law provides that, “public juridic persons 
need civil-law counterparts—normally nonprofit corporations—in order to 
transact civil-law business, such as holding title to property.”104 As a public 
juridic person organized under canon law, the Catholic Church regards Catholic 
Healthcare Foundation as an official part of the Catholic Church, so the court 
agrees that the Catholic Health Initiatives, its civil law counterpart, is “associated 
with” a church.105 
iv. A Combination Approach of Medina plus Lown 
While the Medina test only has binding force over the Tenth Circuit, the 
thoroughness of the analysis will likely have persuasive force in other courts in 
the future; it could be combined with the Lown factors and then applied 
nationwide as a standard test in determining if an organization is principally 
purposed. Here, each step of the test will be deconstructed further to demonstrate 
how district and circuit courts could apply this inquiry.  
Step one asks if the entity is a tax-exempt non-profit organization 
associated with a church.106 It’s not enough for an entity to be established by a 
religious entity; it must currently maintain an association.107 It should be clear 
according to an entity’s charter whether it is a non-profit organization; the only 
issue that could arise is regarding the definition of “association.”108 In analyzing 
this first prong, courts should turn to the Lown factors, where an institution is 
“associated with” a church when: (1) the church plays an official role in the 
governance of the organization, (2) the organization received assistance from the 
religious institution, or (3) a denominational requirement exists for any 
employee, patient, or customer of the organization.109 This inquiry is fact-based 
and any entity should be able to determine for itself whether these terms are met. 
Should the entity meet at least one element of step one, the inquiry moves 
forward to the Medina step two.  
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The second step considers whether the entity’s retirement plan is 
maintained by an organization whose principal purpose is administering or 
funding a retirement plan for entity employees.110 The Tenth Circuit in Medina 
reasoned that the term “maintain,” as used in this context, must mean “to keep in 
a state of validity.”111 In some cases, the umbrella religiously-affiliated entity 
maintains retirement plans for its own employees, but in most cases this 
responsibility is outsourced to another organization. This separation allows 
medical facilities to focus on their medical duties, while allowing another 
organization to focus principally on employee benefits. In this case, this other 
organization must care for the plan for purposes of “operational productivity.”112 
In Medina, for example, the plan was maintained by an internal plan 
subcommittee, which was considered to be an alter ego; because it provided 
benefits to employees of a religious nonprofit organization, the Tenth Circuit 
found it was associated with a church.113  
The third part of the test asks whether the principal purpose organization 
maintaining the plan is itself associated with a church.114 This is the main issue 
presented. At first glance, this prong seems to be repetitive of part two of the test, 
defining a “principal purpose” organization as one that has a “principal purpose,” 
but this part looks further than the status of the entity seeking the exemption. Not 
only does the entity itself have to be associated with a church, but its retirement 
plan must also be “maintained” by a principle purpose organization.115 For 
example, in Advocate, the religiously-affiliated hospital was clearly a principal 
purpose organization, but the Court did not decide whether the hospital’s 
subcommittee that managed the retirement plans was also a principal purpose 
organization.116 In Medina, this question was easily solved in the affirmative 
because the subcommittee that managed the plan was completely controlled by 
the larger entity.117 “As a matter of logic,” the court stated, “a subdivision wholly 
encompassed by a larger entity shares that entity’s affiliations.”118 This court 
expressly declined to address the same issue that Advocate left unanswered: 
whether the medical facility’s internal benefit committee qualified as a “principal 
purpose organization.”119 Besides this limited guidance, the scope of a “principal 
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purpose organization” remains undefined.120 Therefore, entities should look 
beyond the case law to try to define “principal purpose.” 
D. Administrative Guidance on Defining “Principal Purpose” in ERISA Cases 
Relying on the language in ERISA’s church plan exemption, the 
Department of Labor and IRS have repeatedly recognized exemptions for  
church-affiliated schools and hospitals plans when the benefits committee 
administering the plans were themselves controlled by a church. However, this 
analysis seems circular in nature by defining church plans as those already 
established as eligible for church plans. If the only function of a hospital’s 
internal benefits committee is to maintain the employee benefit plan, then clearly 
that organization is principally purposed. Yet, if the same committee took on 
additional roles, such as ones typically performed by an in-house human 
resources department, it is unclear whether it would maintain that status.   
A plan will qualify as a church plan only if it is first maintained by an 
organization and controlled by or associated with a  church whose principal 
purpose or function is to administer the plan.121 The IRS’s general position, 
reflected in several PLRs, is a principally purposed organization’s retirement 
sub-committee that administers the plan as its sole purpose is also considered a 
principal purpose organization.122 However, when such a committee has other 
purposes,  the standard becomes  muddied.  
Most of the administrative guidance addressing ERISA § 3(33) gives little 
insight into the reasoning behind the IRS and the Department of Labor’s 
decisions on whether or not an organization is principally purposed. In countless 
PLRs, the IRS seems to simply accept the requesting party’s assertion that its 
organization is principally purposed.123 Many of these reports include a 
statement similar to this: because the organization’s principal purpose is to 
administer the employee retirement plan, it is a “principal purpose” 
organization.124 This circular reasoning provided by the IRS is far from 
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enlightening.125 Religiously-affiliated hospitals could read a hundred PLRs 
based on this statutory provision126 and still fail to understand whether its own 
employee benefit committees comply.  
The only rare guidance that religiously-affiliated hospital and their 
employee benefit committees have to rely on are a few administrative guidance 
documents issued prior to Advocate. When at least 80% of the employee benefit 
committee meetings include discussion of administration or funding of the Plan, 
the Department of Labor found that it met the principal purpose test.127 When the 
benefits committee’s principal overall function is to shape the policy and direct 
the operations of the plan and other retirement and welfare benefit plans 
maintained by the organization, the IRS found that it met the principal purpose 
test.128 Yet, it is not necessary for the individuals who are officers of a principal 
purpose organization, such a religiously-controlled hospital, to do so on a full-
time basis or to have their role with the organization as their principal activity or 
responsibility.129 When a benefits plan committee’s sole responsibility was 
expanded to include provision of the other benefits for lay employees of the 
hospital, it still qualified as a “church plan.”130 Lastly, a committee still retained 
its principal purpose status despite having expanded duties that included the 
power: “to adopt bylaws and to make and enforce rules and regulations for 
administration of Plan X, to determine all questions of eligibility for benefits, 
duration of employment, computation of benefits and value of benefits, to 
employ necessary advisors, to maintain adequate records and file appropriate 
government filings . . .”131 Despite the magnitude of private letter rulings issued 
directly addressing this ERISA provision, a religiously-affiliated medical facility 
and its subcommittees still have little guidance on which to proceed. Therefore, 
it may look elsewhere to try to define clear guidelines around the term “principal 
purpose.” 
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E. Administrative Guidance on Defining “Principal Purpose” as Used in Non-
ERISA Cases 
As almost a last resort, an entity seeking to determine if it meets the 
requirements of ERISA § 3(33) may look to other administrative guidelines 
issued in contexts outside the realm of ERISA that define the terms “principal 
purpose.” For example, a hospital is considered to be “charitable”132 when its 
“principal purpose and function” is the provision of medical and hospital care.133 
An educational organization’s “principal purpose and function” is the 
presentation of formal education in the instructive sense when it regularly 
maintains a faculty and a curriculum and regularly enrolled body of pupils or 
students in attendance at the place where its educational activities are regularly 
carried on.134 A rehabilitation institution or an out-patient clinic may qualify as 
a hospital if its “principal purpose or functions” is the provision of hospital or 
medical care.135 Where the principal purpose and functions of an organization 
are the maintenance of a museum and library and other facilities for research, 
with secondary activities in furtherance of the organization’s graduate and post-
graduate educational aims, the organization does not constitute an educational 
organization.136 An organization whose activities have the aspects of a church or 
association of churches, an educational organization, and a hospital, but whose 
principal purposes or functions are not those of a church or association of 
churches, or an educational organization, or a hospital, does not qualify under 
any of the classes of “charitable” organizations set forth in IRC § 
170(b)(1)(A).137 
F. An Amalgam of Approaches 
Since not one proposed approach is fool proof, religiously-affiliated 
hospital are likely to apply some or all of these approaches in their attempt to 
define their own employee benefits committee as principal purpose. At the end 
of the day, though, the Advocate ruling provides little guidance for the typical 
religiously-affiliated hospital. It’s time for Congress to take action and clearly 
define the requirements for ERISA’s church plan exemption. The stakes are too 
high for the standard to be this muddy.  
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CONCLUSION 
After Advocate v. Stapleton, the Supreme Court seemed to leave as many 
questions unanswered as answered. Religiously-affiliated hospitals and their 
employee benefit committees remain in a tough spot where they must make a 
best guess as to whether to blindly rely on the church plan exemption or go 
through the arduous private letter rulings process to know for sure. Because so 
much is on the line—especially all their employees’ long term retirement 
accounts—hospitals are more likely to take the latter approach. While large 
hospitals may be able to afford this extra cost, smaller religiously-controlled 
entities like private schools and nursing homes will likely face more challenges. 
So in the long run, Advocate doesn’t actually save these church-affiliated entities 
any time or money. Without a clear answer, the men and women who choose to 
work at a non-profit medical facility have to take the risk that their pension plans 
could disappear should the entity ever cease to exist. It’s imperative that the 
Court address this issue and clearly decide it once and for all.  
 
